



Data: Professional Sports and Mixed Strategies

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

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Mixed Strategies



• Some counter-intuitive features...

• Do people really play them?

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Professional Soccer - Penalty Kicks



- Ignacio Palacios-Heurta (2003) "Professionals Play Minimax" Review of Economic Studies, Volume 70, pp 395-415
- 1417 Penalty kicks from FIFA games: Spain, England, Italy...
- Ignacio considers left, center, or right choices, and considered which leg the kicker used; I will keep it down to left and right choices (his page 402) ignoring kicker's leg.

Soccer Penalty Kicks



Kicker/Goalie	Left	Right	
Left	.58,.42	.95, .05	
Right	.93, .07	.70, .30	

Pause the Video and Solve the Game



• The Goalie's probability of going Left p_G versus Right $1 - p_G$ must have the kicker indifferent

• The Kicker's probability of going Left p_K versus Right $1-p_K$ must have the goalie indifferent

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• The Goalie's probability of going Left p_G versus Right $1 - p_G$ must have the kicker indifferent

•
$$p_G.58 + (1 - p_G).95 = .93p_G + .7(1 - p_G)$$
 or $.25(1 - p_G) = .35p_G$ or $p_G = 5/12 = .42$

• The Kicker's probability of going Left p_K versus Right $1 - p_K$ must have the goalie indifferent

•
$$p_K.42 + (1 - p_K).07 = .05p_K + .3(1 - p_K)$$
 or
 $.23(1 - p_K) = .37p_K$ or $p_K = 23/60 = .38$



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Soccer Penalty Kicks - The Data



	Goalie	Goalie	Kicker	Kicker
	Left	Right	Left	Right
Nash Freq.	.42	.58	.38	.62
Actual Freq.	.42	.58	.40	.60



- Do players randomize well over time? Pretty well...
- How about under pressure? Do they become predictable? Statisticians/Game Theorists starting to keep them honest...
- Other sports: Tennis players and serves, M. Walker and J. Wooders, American Economic Review (2001) "Minimax Play and Wimbeldon" volume 91, pp 1521-1538.

- Some games have mixed strategy equilibria
- A players must be indifferent between the actions he or she randomizes over
- Interesting comparative statics
- Do see randomization:

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 - in nature: which way a squirrel runs to get out of your way),
 - in society and business interactions: audits by tax authorities!